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Abstract 
Monopsony is often observed in local agricultural markets in developing countries because of the high 
entry cost to buyers; farmers in such markets therefore sell their agricultural products at a lower price. However, this 
situation seems to be changing with the diffusion of mobile phones. This paper investigates how access to market 
information through mobile phone usage impacts the selling price of rice in rural areas in Cambodia. We conducted a 
survey of farmers’ households concerning agricultural production processes and rice sales in 20 villages in four 
provinces (Battambang, Prey Veng, Pursat, and Takeo). We find that farmers who have access to market information 
through the use of mobile phones are more likely to sell their rice at a higher price. In addition, we observe that the 
offers received by farmers with better access to market information through mobile phone usage tend to affect selling 
prices. The results imply that improved access to market information through the use of mobile phones improves 
farmers’ bargaining power against traders, enabling them to sell their rice at a higher price. 
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1. Introduction 
Monopsony is widely observed in local agricultural markets in developing countries 
because of the high entry cost of buyers such as traders. As a result, farmers tend to sell their 
agricultural products at less than the wholesale price in the local agricultural market.  
 
This situation has changed with the diffusion of information communication technologies 
(ICTs). These technologies allow farmers to acquire information on market outcomes such as selling 
prices in other markets, enabling them to sell their agricultural products in other markets at higher 
prices. Since one of the widely used ICTs, the mobile phone, is relatively inexpensive and does not 
require an urban environment, it is used by many people in rural areas. In fact, 50–60% of 
households in rural areas in countries such as the Dominican Republic, Guyana, and Swaziland own 
mobile phones (Jensen, 2010). If the mobile phone contributes to the effective functioning of 
markets by improving access to market information, the selling prices of agricultural products 
should increase.  
 
Previous studies have also examined the impact of ICTs on the selling price of 
agricultural products. Svensson and Yanagizawa (2009) investigated the impact of market 
information transmitted via FM radio on the farm-gate price of maize in Uganda and found that 
informed farmers sell at higher prices. Ochiai and Yamasaki (2013) found that the diffusion of 
mobile phones in rural areas in India increased the selling price of wheat for small-scale farmers. 
However, SMS-based commercial services that deliver market and weather information had no 
impact on selling prices in India (Marcel and Minten, 2012). Lee and Bellemare (2013) showed that 
farmers in the Philippines sell agricultural crops at higher prices in cases where either a household’s 
father or his spouse owns a mobile phone. However, household ownership of a mobile phone is not 
correlated with selling prices. As described, the impact of the ownership of a mobile phone or 
improved access to market information on selling prices is not necessarily positive. Our contribution 
in this literature is that we estimate the impact of improved access to market information through 
mobile phone usage on the selling price of rice in rural areas in Cambodia. To examine the reasons 
for its effect, we first analyze how improved access to market information affects farmers’ 
bargaining power against buyers.  
 
We carried out a survey of rice farmers in 20 villages in four provinces (Battambang, 
Prey Veng, Pursat, and Takeo) in Cambodia from December 2012 to January 2013 as a part of an 
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assessment of the post-harvest technology intervention of the International Rice Research Institution 
(IRRI). The IRRI has implemented such interventions to improve living standards in rural areas in 
Cambodia since 2005. In this survey, we collected extensive information on the status of mobile 
phone ownership, usage of mobile phones to access market information, agricultural activities 
during the past year, marketing activities, usage conditions of post-harvest technologies, social and 
demographic characteristics, and non-agricultural income sources. The survey allows us to analyze 
the impact of improved access to market information through the use of mobile phones on the selling 
price of rice while controlling for the effects of other determinants on selling prices such as the 
quality of sold rice and household characteristics. 
 
Farmers who access market information using mobile phones are likely to sell their rice 
at a higher price. However, ownership of mobile phones does not affect the selling price. This 
implies that it is not the ownership of mobile phones but rather access to market information via 
mobile phones that determines the increase of the selling price of rice. In addition, offers of farmers 
with access to market information through the use of mobile phones tend to affect selling prices. 
Improved access to market information through mobile phone usage increases the farmers’ 
bargaining power against buyers, and thus, farmers can sell rice at a higher price. 
 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review previous 
studies regarding the impact of market information on agricultural markets and on the selling prices 
of agricultural products in developing countries. Section 3 explains the agricultural situations in 
Cambodia and our study’s survey design. Section 4 explains the estimation methods that we apply 
and examines the effect of improved access to market information through mobile phone usage on 
the selling price of rice and on farmers’ bargaining power against buyers. The last section concludes. 
 
 
2. Literature review 
 Previous studies have primarily focused on the two channels through which market 
information affects selling prices.1 We explain the impact of market information on arbitrage. 
Suppose there are two markets with one agricultural product. For simplicity, price information does 
                                            
1 Other papers also examine the impact of mobile phones on farmers’ behavior in developing 
countries (e.g., Muto and Yamano, 2010). 
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not diffuse over the two markets and transportation between these markets is costly. We consider a 
situation in which the price of the product differs between the two markets because of the difference 
in the quantity of supply of the product in the markets. If farmers can obtain the selling price in the 
other market and if the transportation cost is not higher than the price difference between these 
markets, farmers in the market where the product’s selling price is lower will go to the other market 
to sell the product. As a result, arbitrage occurs between the markets, the difference in the prices 
between the markets will decrease, and Pareto efficiency will be achieved. 
 
Several empirical studies examine the important role of mobile phones in market 
arbitrage in local agricultural markets in developing countries. Jensen’s (2007) study provided an 
excellent example for this mechanism in the market for sardines in Kerala, a southern Indian state. 
Before the introduction of mobile phones, arbitrage across markets did not occur because access to 
price information for sardines was limited. The introduction of mobile phones stimulated arbitrage 
across markets, price dispersion across markets diminished, and the excess supply of sardines was 
eliminated. As a result, the profits of fishermen increased by 8% and consumer surplus increased by 
6%. Aker (2010) investigated the impact of mobile phones in millet markets in Niger. Since mobile 
phones facilitate traders’ search activity in markets, the expected impact of mobile phones is almost 
the same as in the case of Jensen (2007). Aker found that price dispersion declined by 10–30% and 
traders’ profits increased by 29%, leading to an increase in consumer welfare. Goyal (2010) 
analyzed the impact of an internet kiosk that provided information on the wholesale price of market 
performance in the central Indian state of Madhya Pradesh. Her result supports the proposition that 
market information improves efficiency in market performance. However, findings by Marcel and 
Minten (2012) for Maharashtra, a state in western India, contradicted this proposition. They 
conducted a randomized controlled experiment to deliver market information—including price and 
weather information—to farmers. Their intervention had no impact on the price variation of 
agricultural products.   
  
Next, we explain the impact of mobile phone usage on the market power of buyers under 
monopsony in the local agricultural market. Because of the high entry cost for buyers (e.g., traders 
must bear fixed costs such as for storage facilities and vehicles for transportation as well as running 
transportation costs such as gas or access to credit for the purchase of agricultural products), the 
entry of buyers is limited in the local agricultural market. Monopsony occurs in local agricultural 
product markets, where farmers sell their agricultural products at a lower price (Jensen, 2010). 
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Market information may lower the degree of monopsony in local agricultural markets. Farmers who 
are informed of the selling prices in other agricultural markets sell their product in these other 
markets2 if the transportation is not more costly than the difference in the selling prices between the 
markets. Thus, buyers in the local agricultural market must set a higher price than what they offered 
previously, and therefore, buyers’ monopsony power in the local agricultural market declines (Goyal, 
2010). In addition, mobile phones allow farmers to communicate with traders. Since this 
communication lowers the search cost of traders, the number of traders who enter the local 
agricultural market increases. As a result, the traders’ monopsony power declines in the local 
agricultural markets (Jensen, 2010). Hence, mobile phones allow farmers to receive a higher price 
for their output.    
 
A number of empirical papers have investigated the impact of better access to market 
information on the selling price. Svensson and Yanagizawa (2009) analyzed the impact of market 
information transmitted via local FM radio stations on the farm-gate prices of maize in Uganda. 
They found that informed farmers sell at a higher farm-gate price. Ochiai and Yamasaki (2013) 
estimated the impact of the diffusion of mobile phones on the selling price of wheat in rural areas in 
India and found a positive impact on the selling price for small-scale farmers. Their interpretations 
of these results are that the information gained through FM radio or mobile phone usage improves 
farmers’ bargaining power against buyers. Marcel and Minten (2012) investigated the impact of 
market information through the SMS messaging service of mobile phones on the selling prices of 
agricultural products. However, they found SMS messaging to have no impact on the selling prices. 
Lee and Bellemare (2013) analyzed how mobile phone ownership affects the prices that farmers 
receive for their cash crops in the Philippines. They found that the selling price increases in cases 
where a household’s father or his spouse has a mobile phone, while farmer ownership of a mobile 
phone did not affect the selling price. Their results imply that the purpose of mobile phone usage is 
related to whether farmers sell their products at a higher price or not.  
 
Our approach differs from the previous studies in two respects. First, in the survey, we 
asked not only about farmers’ ownership of mobile phones, but also whether they access market 
                                            
2 Farmers usually sell their products to traders at the local monopsony market, whereas the traders sell their purchases to 
wholesalers in a competitive market. If farmers can sell their agricultural products directly at the wholesale market, they can sell 
their goods at a competitive price.  
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information at the time they sell their rice. Thus, we can directly analyze the impact of improved 
access to market information through mobile phone usage on the selling price of agricultural 
products. Second, we investigate how improved access to market information through mobile phone 
usage improves farmers’ bargaining power against buyers. Previous studies examined the 
relationship between access to market information and the selling prices of agricultural products. 
However, they did not specify in detail the reasons why improved access to market information 
increases the selling price of agricultural products.3  
 
  
3. Data 
Rice farming is an important income source in Cambodia. Rice is a main cereal crop, and 
80% of farmers in Cambodia are engaged in rice farming, which covers approximately 80% of 
Cambodia’s total cultivated land. According to the World Development Indicators of the World 
Bank,4 the percentage of value added by the agriculture sector to GDP was 37% in 2008. 
Small-scale farmers’ production systems and the lack of organized rice farmers associations lower 
farmers’ bargaining power against buyers. Therefore, the selling prices of rice in rural areas tend to 
be lower than those in urban areas; this creates a profit margin from arbitrage (El-Noush, 2010). In 
Cambodia, buyers earn 10–15% of the market price as margin (UNDP, 2004). 
 
Many farmers sell their rice immediately after harvest, while others sell their rice after 
drying. This might be related to limited storage facilities (El-Noush, 2010). In addition, they are 
under pressure to sell their rice as soon as their crop is harvested because farmers are usually 
contracted to pay back their debt immediately following the harvesting season. In fact, 25.9 % of 
farmers borrowed money for farming in wet season in our sample. Therefore, they tend to sell their 
crop at a price offered by local buyers such as grain traders instead of searching for buyers who 
could offer a higher price. 
                                            
3 Although previous studies have attempted to identify the causal effect of access to market information on selling prices by using 
natural experiments (e.g., Svensson and Yanagizawa (2009) applied the difference-in-difference method) or field experiments (e.g., 
Marcel and Minten (2012) applied the randomized control trial method), these studies could not identify why access to market 
information raises selling prices. It is necessary to collect not only farmer information but also buyer information to identify the 
mechanism. 
4 Accessed on December 28, 2013. http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators 
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We conducted a survey of farmers in 20 villages in four provinces (Battambang, Prey 
Veng, Pursat, and Takeo) from December 2012 to January 2013 to assess the post-harvest 
technology interventions that the IRRI implemented to improve living standards in rural areas in 
Cambodia. The survey period corresponds to the one-month period following the wet season 
because almost all of the rice farmers in Cambodia are engaged in rice farming during this period. 
We collected information on farmers’ ownership of mobile phones, usage of mobile phones to 
access market information, agricultural activities during the past year, marketing activities, usage of 
post-harvest technologies, social and demographic characteristics, and non-agricultural income 
sources. In the survey, we selected farmers randomly in each village and invited them to a public 
place in the village. Enumerators were assigned to each farmer. Each enumerator started the 
interview at a distance from the other enumerators to avoid the influence of other farmers’ responses. 
We requested that the selected farmer be the household head or his wife. The enumerators asked the 
farmers each question orally to avoid any misunderstanding. Each respondent received a gift at the 
end of the interview.  
 
Since the primary purpose of the survey is to assess the mid-term impact of these 
post-harvest interventions, the surveyed villages were divided into treatment villages and control 
villages. Treatment villages received post-harvest technological equipment5 from the IRRI while 
control villages did not. We collected the same information from both groups for our analysis.   
 
Two types of rice seed are predominantly used in Cambodia: traditional variety seed and 
modern variety seed. The former is an indigenous variety that farmers have used for a long time; the 
latter is a hybrid introduced to Cambodia in the 1990s (FAO, 2002). The selling prices of traditional 
variety rice are usually higher than those of modern variety rice—this may reflect Cambodian 
people’s taste. Cambodia has three agricultural seasons: dry, early wet, and wet. The seed types have 
different tolerance levels: farmers can sow the traditional variety only during the wet season, while 
the modern variety can be sown in all seasons.  
 
                                            
5 The provided post-harvest technologies in the project include combined harvesting services, mechanical dryers, hermetic storage 
systems (including 50 kg Super Bags (SB)), granary improvements, rice milling improvements, moisture meters, scales, cleaners, 
and thermometers. 
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Our survey asked specifically when farmers sold their rice. According to our data, most 
farmers sold their rice immediately after the harvest rather than after drying the rice (285 cases of 
sales were immediately after harvest, while 68 cases were after drying). This is consistent with the 
anecdotal evidence we mentioned in section 3 (El-Noush, 2010). In our main analysis, we use the 
sample of farmers who sold their rice immediately after harvest.6 
 
Although we surveyed 349 households, not all farmers sold rice in the past year (some 
farmers produce rice for self-consumption). In our sample, 162 farmers sold rice after harvest at least 
once in the past year.7 Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the farmers. The average age of a 
household head is 49 years old. Household heads have completed an average of 4.9 years of 
education. The share of male heads in our sample is 82.1%. The average number of years of rice 
farming is 28.1 years. The average total non-agricultural income is 3.2 million riel. 
 
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics of the variables related to rice sales (including 
the characteristics of rice and rice plots). The average selling price of rice is 958.0 riel/kg, and 21.3% 
of farmers’ offers affect the selling price. Regarding the usage of mobile phones to access market 
information, 80.5% of farmers use mobile phones to acquire market information before selling their 
rice. Regarding the types of rice over seasons in our sample, 44.9% of rice was the traditional variety 
planted in the wet season, 5.5% was the modern variety planted in the wet season, 21.0% was the 
modern variety planted in the early wet season, and 28.7% the was modern variety planted in the dry 
season. Farmers sold an average of 2,744 kg of rice. Average rice plot size was 1.2 ha. Regarding the 
soil type of the plots, the shares of loam, clay, and sand are 86.0%, 14.0% and 0.4%, respectively.  
 
 
4. Estimation method and results 
4.1  Impact on the selling price of rice 
 First, we investigate the effect of improved access to market information through the use 
of mobile phones. We estimate the following model using ordinary least squares,  
 
                                            
6 If we include both types of farmers in the sample—those who sell immediately after harvest and those who sell after drying—we 
cannot control for the quality of the rice produced according to the soil quality of plots because farmers aggregate rice after drying. 
7 230 farmers sold their surplus rice at least once during the past year. 
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𝑝!"# = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒!"# + 𝑧! + 𝑢!"#$,           (1) 
 
where 𝑝!"#$ is the log of selling price of rice that farmer i grows in plot j at period t; 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒!"# 
indicates whether farmer i used a mobile phone to acquire market information before selling rice 
grown in plot j at period t; 𝑧! is the village fixed effects; 𝑢!"#$ is the error term. Since common 
idiosyncratic shocks such as weather in a village may occur, we estimate the 
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard error, accounting for clustering within villages. Equation (1) 
allows us to control for the (time-invariant) characteristics of each village (e.g., accessibility to 
markets in urban areas) and to estimate the impact of the degree of access to market information on 
the selling price. 
 
The estimated result of Equation (1) is shown in column 1 of Table 3. The coefficients 
for village fixed effects are not shown in Table 3 to save space. The estimated coefficient for 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒!"# is positive and significant. This implies that farmers who use mobile phones to acquire 
market information tend to increase the selling price by 4.4 %. However, other factors are omitted in 
Equation (1), resulting in omitted variable bias in the estimated coefficient of 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒!"# . For 
example, the educational level of farmers is omitted in Equation (1). Educated farmers tend to use 
mobile phones to acquire market information and sell their rice at a higher price. In this case, the 
estimated coefficient for 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒!"# in Equation (1) is biased upward because of the effect of 
educational level. Another factor may induce bias in the estimated coefficient for 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒!"# in 
Equation (1). Farmers who acquire market information using mobile phones choose a better quality 
of rice to sell and thus sell it at a higher price. As a result, the estimated coefficient for 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒!"# is 
biased upward because of the effect from the better quality of rice.   
 
To remove these biases, we add explanatory variables such as farmers’ characteristics 
and rice quality to Equation (1). Equation (1) then becomes  
 𝑝!"#$ = 𝛾! + 𝛾!𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒!"# + 𝛾!  𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔!"# + 𝛾!  𝑋! + 𝑧! + 𝑒!"#$,           (2)                
 
where 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔!"# is a vector of variables directly affecting the selling price, such as the variety of 
rice, quantity of rice, size of the plot in which the rice was grown, and the soil quality of the plot;  𝑋! 
is a vector of farmers’ characteristics (age of household head, education of head, years of rice 
farming, sex of head, non-agricultural income in the past year); 𝑒!"#$ is the error term. We also 
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estimate the heteroscedasticity-consistent standard error, accounting for clustering within villages. 
Equation (2) allows us to control for the characteristics of the quality of rice, farmer characteristics, 
and village characteristics.   
 
 The estimation results for Equation (2) are shown in column 2 of Table 3. We do not 
report the coefficients for the village fixed effects in Table 3 to save space. Along with the estimated 
results of Equation (1), the estimated coefficient for 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒!"# is positive and significant, but the 
magnitude of the estimated coefficient for 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒!"# is greater than that for Equation (1). This 
implies that other uncontrolled determinants of the selling price of rice in Equation (1) are correlated 
with both the usage of mobile phones and the selling price of rice.  
 
The selling prices of traditional variety rice are higher than those of modern variety rice. 
The selling prices of rice grown in plots with sandy soil are significantly lower. The quantity of rice 
significantly increases the selling price. This result is consistent with the anecdotal explanation in 
El-Noush (2010) that small-scale farmers tend to sell their rice at lower prices. However, it is 
difficult to explain why small-scale farmers sell at lower prices. Household characteristics are also 
found to affect the selling price: the coefficients for the age of the household head and total 
non-agricultural income are positive and significant.  
 
Robustness Check  
        While most farmers sell their rice to grain traders, some sell to millers or others. Thus far, 
we have not distinguished to whom the farmers sold rice8. Here, we limit the sample to farmers who 
sold rice to grain traders to estimate Equation (2). Grain traders usually buy rice in villages. The 
following estimation corresponds to how improved access to market information through mobile 
phone usage affects the selling price in the local agricultural market. The result is shown in column 3 
of Table 3. The estimated coefficient for 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒!"# is positive, while its significance level is lower 
than that in column 2 of Table 3.  
 
        Thus far, we have focused on the sale of rice immediately after harvesting, although some 
farmers in our sample sold rice after drying. We now check whether our result is robust with the 
addition of farmers who sold rice after drying to the sample used in column 2 of Table 3. However, 
                                            
8 In our sample, 237 buyers are grain traders, 6 buyers are miller and 29 buyers are others. 
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we cannot control for the conditions of the plots in which rice grows because farmers aggregate rice 
after drying. Thus, we replace plot characteristics such as plot size and soil quality with a dummy 
variable indicating whether or not farmers sell rice after drying in Equation (2) and estimate a 
modified version of Equation (2). The result of this estimation is shown in column 1 of Table 4. The 
estimated coefficient for mobile phone usage is positive and significant. In addition, we limit the 
sample used for column 2 in Table 4 to farmers who sold rice to grain traders and estimate the 
modified version of Equation (2) again. The result of the estimation is presented in column 2 of 
Table 4. The estimated coefficient for 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒!"# on the selling price is also positive and significant.  
 
Falsification test 
 As indicated above, improved access to market information through mobile phone usage 
is positively correlated with the selling price while controlling for rice quality and farmers’ 
characteristics. However, an unobservable heterogeneity of farmers may affect both the usage of 
mobile phones to access market information and the selling price because whether or not farmers use 
mobile phones to acquire market information is the farmers’ choice. Thus, the conditional 
independent assumption (CIA) as the necessary condition to identify the hypothesized causality may 
not be satisfied (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). If the CIA is violated, the unobservable heterogeneity 
of farmers results in a bias in the estimated coefficient for 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒!"# in our estimation results.   
 
For example, an unobservable difference between mobile phone owners and non-owners 
may appear in the estimated coefficient for 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒!"#  in Equation (2). If the unobservable 
difference is correlated with the selling price of rice, we are unable to isolate the effects of improved 
access to market information through mobile phone usage from the unobservable differences among 
the statuses of mobile phone owners. To test this possibility directly, we replace the variable of 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒!"# with a dummy variable indicating whether the farmer owns a mobile phone or not in 
Equation (2) and estimate this modified version of Equation (2). The estimated result is indicated in 
column 1 of Table 5. The estimated coefficient for ownership of a mobile phone is positive but 
non-significant. This implies that the unobservable heterogeneity in the differences among the 
statuses of mobile phone owners does not cause a bias in the estimated coefficient for 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒!"# in 
our estimation results. This is consistent with the result of Lee and Bellemare (2013), who found that 
the status of farmers’ ownership of mobile phones is not correlated with the selling price in the 
Philippines.  
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The effects of other unobservable factors may cause a bias in the estimated coefficient 
for 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒!"# in our estimation results. Farmers who usually take market information into account 
may sell their rice at a high price regardless of their usage of mobile phones to acquire market 
information. In this case, the effects of the unobservable characteristics of these farmers cause a 
selection bias in the estimated coefficient for 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒!"# because of a violation of the CIA. Here, we 
investigate whether or not the effects of these farmers affect the selling price of rice irrespective of 
the usage of mobile phones to acquire market information. These farmers are expected to ask their 
relatives or other farmers about market information and to sell their rice at a higher price. In this case, 
farmers’ source of market information should be positively correlated with the selling price 
regardless of mobile phone usage for access to market information. To test this possibility, we 
replace the variables for 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒!"# in Equation (2) with a dummy variable indicating the answer to 
the question, “What is your source(s) of information on output price?” In particular, we focus on two 
sources: relatives and other farmers. The results are shown in columns 2 and 3 of Table 5. The 
estimated coefficients of information sources are not significant. These results imply that these 
farmers’ behavior does not cause a bias in the estimated coefficient for 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒!"#. 
 
 
4.2  Impact on farmers’ bargaining power against buyers 
We now proceed to the second empirical analysis. As we have shown, improved access 
to market information through mobile phone usage increases the price of rice; however, at this point, 
we still cannot specify why this is. In this subsection, we analyze whether or not access to market 
information through the use of mobile phones improves farmers’ bargaining power against buyers. 
Previous studies have explained the positive effect of market information on selling price as being 
caused by an improvement of farmers’ bargaining power against buyers (Ochiai and Yamasaki, 
2013; Svensson and Yanagizawa, 2009). However, they did not directly analyze the effect of market 
information on bargaining power against buyers. 
 
In our survey, we asked whether farmers’ offers affected the selling price of rice at the 
time of sale. If farmers’ bargaining power against buyers is high at the time of sale, farmers’ offer 
should affect the selling price. We use a dummy variable for whether farmers’ offers affect the 
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selling price as an indicator of farmers’ bargaining power against buyers.9 We replace the selling 
price, the dependent variable in Equation (2), with the dummy variable for the indicator of farmers’ 
bargaining power against buyers. We estimate the modified version of Equation (2) using the probit 
model. The average marginal effect of the coefficient for 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒!"# is shown in column 1 of Table 
6. It is positive and significant.10 This implies that offers of farmers with access to market 
information through mobile phone usage affect the selling price. The result is robust even when we 
limit the sample to farmers who sold their rice to grain traders (see column 2 in Table 6). Thus, 
improved access to market information through mobile phone usage improves farmers’ bargaining 
power against grain traders, and consequently, farmers are able to sell their rice at a higher price.  
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
In developing countries, monopsony is widely observed in local agricultural markets 
because of high entry costs, and thus, farmers sell their agricultural products at lower prices. 
However, this trend has changed recently with the diffusion of mobile phones. Mobile phone usage 
contributes to the effective functioning of markets by dispersing market information such as the 
selling prices of agricultural products. As a result, the selling prices of agricultural products increase. 
In this paper, we have investigated the impact of improved access to market information through 
mobile phone usage on the selling price of rice in rural areas in Cambodia, controlling for 
determinants of selling price such as the quality of rice and the characteristics of farmers. Moreover, 
in order to examine why improved access to market information through the use of mobile phones 
increases the selling price of rice, we have analyzed how it affects farmers’ bargaining power against 
buyers regarding the selling price of rice. Our analysis is based on data collected by the authors in 20 
villages in four provinces (Battambang, Prey Veng, Pursat, and Takeo) from December 2012 to 
January 2013. 
 
We found that improved access to market information through mobile phone usage 
increases the selling price of rice. However, because of the limitations of our research design, we 
                                            
9 It is difficult to measure bargaining power between farmers and buyers exactly. We follow an indicator of bargaining power 
within households in the context of family economics (e.g., Li and Wu, 2011; Reggio, 2010).  
10 The main result does not change even if we use a linear probability model. The results are available from the 
authors upon request.  
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were not able to statistically examine the causal relationship between improved access to market 
information through mobile phone usage and the selling price of rice. However, our results are 
robust even when we limited the sample to farmers who sell rice to grain traders. The falsification 
tests show that neither the effect of the unobservable heterogeneity of the ownership of mobile 
phones nor the effect of farmers who seek market information affects our results. Thus, our results 
are likely to provide the causal effect of the degree of access to market information on the selling 
price. In addition, improved access to market information through the use of mobile phones 
improves farmers’ bargaining power against grain traders. Therefore, access to market information 
through mobile phone usage allows farmers to sell their rice at higher prices.  
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Variable Sample Mean Std.Dev
 Age of head 162 48.963 11.886
 Education of head (year) 162 4.889 3.044
 Sex of head (1 = male, 0 = female) 162 0.821 0.385
 Years of rice farming 162 28.117 12.662
 Total nonagricutural income (riel) 162 3192324 3479706
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of households
Notes
1. As of 31 December 2012, US$1 was equivalent to 3,909.4 Cambodian Riel.
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Variable Sample Mean Std.Dev
Dependent variable
 Selling price (riel/kg) 272 957.960 194.476
 Did farmer offer affect selling price? (0 = yes, 1 = no) 268 0.213 0.410
Independent variables
 Whether farmers use mobile phone for gain market
 information (1 = yes, 0 = no) 272 0.805 0.397
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of plot level
Quality
  Modern Variety  in dry season 272 0.287 0.453
  Modern Variety  in early wet season 272 0.210 0.408
  Modern Variety  in wet season 272 0.055 0.229
  Traditional Variety  in wet season 272 0.449 0.498
Quantity (kg) 272 2744.36 2840.157
Plot size (ha) 272 1.267 1.086
Type of soil
  Clay 272 0.140 0.347
  Sandy 272 0.004 0.061
  Loam 272 0.860 0.347
  Other 279 0.070 0.255
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